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Introduction
Countries and governments are expressing growing concern with regard to reciprocity or asymmetry in market access caused by the differences in the structure of tariffs and the proliferation of standards, sanitary and technical barriers to trade. 1 The trade war between the EU and the US on 'hormone beef', GMOs and bananas, as well as that between the US and Japan on cars and apples, represent some illustrate examples of these issues. In theory, the use of a micro funded framework to measure trade policy restrictiveness (see Anderson and Neary, 2005 ) offers a sound approach to handle such problems. However, the approach is very demanding in that it requires high quality data on direct measures of policy barriers that, when existing, are poor and incomplete especially (but not only) with regard to non-tariff barriers to trade (see Bureau and Salvatici, 2004a; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) .
Indeed, the evidence of direct protection measures often differs quite markedly, rendering the apparently simple question on 'how high are policy barriers to trade?' a very difficult answer when you are interested in a careful examination for most industries in most countries for several years. A look at the literature on EU agri-food protection is illustrative of this problem (see Bureau and Salvatici, 2004a) . Direct estimates of the EU average agricultural tariff reveals a spread of estimates, ranging from the 40% of Messerlin (2001) to the 9.7% of Gallezot (2003) , with intermediate value of 18% of Bureau and Salvatici (2004b) . As suggested by the last authors, what is 'puzzling' here is that none of these figures are wrong, they simply result by different assumptions in calculating an aggregate tariff.
Given these problems, the literature now considers the possibility of using a complementary and indirect measure of market access, based on recent 1 This concern is well explained by the growing resource devoted by several countries in collecting and rationalizing 'private' information on market access issues. A review of the afford taken by the major trading blocs could be found in the last Report on the EU Market Access Database. See http: //madb.europa.eu/mkaccdb2/indexPubli.htm. developments in the theory of gravity. Indeed this 'workhorse' tool has recently been developed in two important directions: the border effect approach initiated by McCallum (1995) and Wei (1996) , and a more careful theoretical foundation due to Deardorff (1998) , Head and Mayer (2000) , Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and many others.
Starting from these considerations, this paper uses the border effect estimated from a theory-consistent gravity model to asses the level and reciprocity in market access in food manufacturing trade among the United States, Canada, the European Union and Japan, the so-called QUAD countries. For a given region, the gravity model estimates the impacts of border effects (trade policy, preferences, information costs, etc.) on the relative volume of intra-versus international trade.
The estimation of market access through the border effect methodology offers two main advantages with respect to direct protection measures. First, as pointed out by Mayer and Zignago (2005) , this approach accounts for the important and often neglected fact that internal demand is, for most products, largely met by domestic producers, not foreign ones. So an ideal protection index from the prospective of foreign producers needs a benchmark based on the best possible market access situation, i.e. that faced by national producers on the home market. This is exactly what the border effect approach reveals on comparing the relative volumes of intra-and international trade in two 'identical' countries. Secondly, the border effect methodology captures all the trade impediments related to the existence of national barriers, quite an advantage as most impediments are very hard to measure directly. For instance, consider the lack of reliable statistics concerning technical, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers that are so pervasive in the agri-food markets, and the inherent difficulty in estimating their trade effect. By using an overall picture based on an indirect estimation approach we overcome these problems.
Finally, the estimation of an overall market access index for sectors and countries characterized by a high degree of policy related barriers -like QUAD food markets -can offer new insights into literature that addresses the question of why national borders matter so much for international trade (see Hillberry, 1999; 2002; Evan, 2003; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Chen, 2004; Fontagné et al., 2005) . Put differently, a contribution of this paper will also be to rechallenge earlier evidences concerning the main significance of the border effect, contrasting the trade policy view with other potential explanations such as 'home bias' in preference and spatial clustering.
From a methodological point of view, our analysis builds on recent papers of Fontagné at al. (2005) and Mayer and Zignago (2005) . They applied the so-called log odd ratio specification of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980) 'love of variety' monopolistic competition trade model, first proposed by Head and Mayer (2000) . This model yields a quite simple estimable prediction, derived directly from theory, for bilateral trade flows. The main advantage over other theorydriven gravity equations (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) is that this model allows an estimation of reciprocal bilateral border effects, one of the main objectives of our analysis.
The paper adds to the literature applying this approach to processed foods trade at a disaggregated level, an industry that is rarely covered by previous studies. This is an advantage, because analysis at aggregate level can mask, due to aggregation bias, important underlying phenomena linked to the inherent heterogeneity of the structure and the location behavior of the industries (see Hillberry, 2002) . Differently, working at a more disaggregate level, should increase our ability to disentangle between competitive explanations on the determinants of border effect.
A second contribution of the analysis is our use of more comprehensive data with regard to policy trade barriers, especially non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, in explaining the border effects. Specifically, advantage is taken of the advalorem equivalent of NTBs recently estimated by Kee et al. (2006) at HS 6-digit level. These new dataset offers two key advantages. First, by using the advalorem equivalent of NTBs, instead of frequency-type measures used in the previous literature (e.g. Fontagné et al. 2005) , we overcame the problem of imposing a strong regularity condition in the estimation of the 'trade' effect of NTBs. This is because frequency-type measures assume that all changes in the index are equally important for trade flow, ignoring the fact that different NTBs can have different trade effects (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2004) . Secondly, by using the ad-valorem equivalent of NTBs together with bilateral tariffs we can directly compare their differentiated effect. This point could be important, as NTBs are trade policy components extraneous to actual WTO negotiations. Thus in order to understand the potential gain from trade policy reform, there is a critical need for a deeper comprehension of the differentiated effect of NTBs with respect to tariffs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and empirical framework. Section 3 describes the data sources and the variables used in the empirical model. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of our estimate on market access reciprocity, while in Section 5 we try to explain it. The final Section outlines our main conclusions.
Conceptual framework
Our gravity equation is based on the monopolistic competition trade model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980) . Monopolistic competition is not the only model that can be used to derive a gravity-like equation 2 . However, it seems the most appropriate to consider processed food trade among the QUADs, given the high level of market concentration in food industries (McCorriston and Sheldon, 2007) , the large dominance of developed country in food trade transactions, and the high and growing importance of intra-industry trade (Sheldon, 2005) . In the derivation of the gravity model, we follow the structure proposed by Head and Mayer (2000) , that offers the key advantage of estimating, in a rigorous framework, reciprocity in market access between two trading partners.
The model
Let xij be the volume of goods produced in country j and consumed in i, and σ the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties. The representative consumer CES utility function in the importing countries i is given by
where nj are (endogenously determined) varieties, identical to the number of firms; aij is the country i consumers' preferences for country j products.
Prices in the importing and exporting countries are introduced in the model using the notion of 'iceberg' trade costs τij, where τii = 1 and τij ≥ 1. This means that τij units of product must be shipped to country i in order for one unit to arrive. Thus, the consumers in i face a price pij for a product imported by j equal to the product of the price pj and the corresponding trade costs, pij = pj τij.
Let
be the country i consumers total expenditure on goods from all sources (varieties) k, including the domestic source. By maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the usual budget constraint, we get the country i total demand for country j products, namely the value of their bilateral imports
Equation (2) could be simplified by noting that in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model the firms set a price as if they face a constant price elasticity of demand, equal to the elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ. Thus the prices pj are expressed as a constant markup over the marginal cost, pj = cj σ/(σ -1). It follows that the output per firm q, defined by the zero profit condition, also depends only on the elasticity of substitution and the marginal costs. Assuming these parameters to be the same across countries, results in proportionality between production value and the number of varieties nj. Denoting vj the value of production in j, we have vj = q nj pj. This equation will be used to eliminate the unobserved nj from the bilateral imports equation (2), using njpj = vj/q. Plugging this notation in (2) and taking logs, yields
The first two terms of equation (3) capture the effects of country size, namely the industrial demand of the importer and the industrial supply of the exporter. The third term captures the effect of bilateral trade costs, while the fourth and fifth terms capture international differences in prices and preferences. The final term is the log summation of some highly non linear term related to variables of all countries, and come from the denominator of the CES price index. This term has been defined by Head and Mayer (2000) as the importer's 'inclusive value' and by Lai and Trefler (2004) as 'market potential', because it depends on the full range of potential supplier k to a given importer.
The correct estimation of the bilateral import equation (3) needs to take account of the influence of this strongly non linear term, that clearly depends on parameters that are already in the equation to be estimated. However the importance of this term also depends on the focus of the empirical analysis.
Indeed, if the objective of the researcher is to exploit the full general equilibrium response of trade flow to trade policies, as, for example, in Lai and Trefler (2004) , then one needs to fully understand, empirically, its influence. On the other hand if the objective is less ambitious, one can follow the interesting manipulation first proposed by Head and Mayer (2000) , working with the so-called log odds specification. 3
To do that, we simply need to set j = i in equation (3) to allow an equation for country imports from itself, log(mii). Then, the elimination of the non linear unobserved price index of the importing country, as well as its total expenditure, will be obtained by subtracting from equation (3) the specification of the country's imports from itself, yielding
(4)
Equation (4) establishes a relation between the relative amounts consumers
spend on foreign and domestic goods, and their relative price net of transport costs, and represents the theoretical counterpart of our empirical specification.
Empirical specification
Before deriving an estimable equation, it is necessary to model both the trade cost and preference components of equation ( 
For simplicity purposes, equation (6) considers only trade between European countries and Canada, where EUij is a dummy variable equal to 1 when i and j are both EU countries (for i ≠ j); EU-CANij is a dummy variable equal to 1 when i (≠ j) belongs to EU and j is Canada; and CAN-EUij is a dummy variable equal to 1 when i is Canada and j (≠ i) belongs to the EU.
In the specification of consumer preferences, aij, we simply assume that consumers prefer goods produced in a contiguous country (Cij) and that the sharing of cultural features (Lij) generates greater similarity in taste. Lij and Cij are two dummy variables that take a value 1 when country i and country j (for i≠ j) speak a common language and/or share a common border (0 otherwise).
Moreover, following Disdier and Mayer (2005) we also introduced variable proxies for common cultural traits and information related costs (Iij). This allows for a better control of preferences and other not-specified border components. The last variables are proxy by the bilateral flow of books and newspapers expressed as the value share available in the importing countries, also allowing control of the fact that when working with the EU countries the usual common language and destination countries. However, this set-up precludes the estimation of reciprocity in border dummy does not offer a satisfactory proxy to capture differences in preferences and information related costs. 4
Plugging in (4) the specifications of the trade costs (5)-(6) and taking into account consumer preference proxies, yields the following log odds form of the (relative) bilateral trade equation
Taking the antilog of (each) estimated border dummy coefficients gives the reciprocal border effect of the respective trade flow combinations, namely the degree to which intra-country trade exceeds international trade after controlling for size, transport costs, preferences and relative prices. The Border effect dummies capture both the average level of protection of the importing country and any other not specified trade costs between i and j. For example, the coefficient on the EUCANij dummy equal to (σ − 1)ϕ, indicates the difficulty faced by Canadian exporters when selling its products to EU markets. Symmetrically, the coefficient on CANEUij equal to (σ − 1)φ indicates the difficulty European exporters have in accessing the Canadian market. By comparing these estimated coefficients, we are able to examine potential asymmetries in market access, both at the overall country level and at the industry-specific level. An early problem in the empirical implementation of equation (7) was that we needed intra-country trade data, but these figures were not available for our country sample. Thus, as in Wei (1996) , Chen (2004) and others, we constructed such data on the basis of the assumption that what a country imports from itself is the difference between its total output and its total export to the rest of the
Data and measures
Moreover, the implementation of the model also needs a measure of intranational distances, dii. This introduces a not negligible difficulty in the model as any incorrect measure of intra-national distances translates into a proportional bias of the border effect estimate (see, Wei, 1996; Head and Mayer, 2002) . To overcome this problem, we followed the approach implemented by Chen (2004) and Head and Mayer (2002) , where distances between and within countries are computed using the same methodology. More specifically, both international and intra-national distances are based on bilateral distances between cities weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population. Data on distances, together with the dummies on language and contiguity, are taken from CEPII 
Results

Estimation of reciprocal market access and asymmetries
We start by estimating the bilateral magnitude of border effects, testing some different specifications based on the gravity equation (7). The results are reported in Table 1 . Regression (1) reports our basic specification where we omit both books and newspapers, vector Iij in equation (7), though these proxies are included in regression (2). Regression (3) The overall fit of the regressions are in line with the usual findings based on this gravity specification. 9 The coefficient on relative production, ranging from 0.84 to 0.75, is quite near the unitary value predicted by the model 10 . The trade elasticity of relative distance is, as expected, negative and strongly significant, with a value close to −1 in all the specifications. In equation (1) the relative price coefficient is positive, though insignificant. However, it turns out to be negative and significant in regressions (2) and (3) when we control for 'preference' and resource endowment. Finally, the coefficients on contiguity and language are, as expected, positive and significant, suggesting that two countries sharing a common language and/or a common border tend to trade more with each other than otherwise.
All the border dummy coefficients are negative and strongly significant. This means that, after controlling for the bilateral determinants of trade flows suggested by theory, intra-country trade is significantly larger than cross-border trade. In regression (1) (2000) and Chen (2004) who show higher intra-EU border coefficients for most 'ingestible products'.
Contrary to expectations, the border effect for intra-EU trade is not the lowest among QUAD countries. Japan's market presents a higher access level for imports from all the countries considered here, especially from the United States.
The results, albeit quite surprising, are similar to previous findings conducted at the manufacturing level. Fontagné et al. (2005) consider that this 'spectacular' result might be driven by an overestimate of the US-Japan distance with respect to intra-EU distances. However, another explanation could be related to comparative advantage differences, due to the resource (land) based nature of many food products. We will return to this point later.
Equation (2) adds to the specification our proxy for 'preference' and information related costs, namely bilateral trade in books and newspapers. Both variables are positive and strongly significant and, interestingly, they induce a relevant reduction in all bilateral border coefficients, as well as in other trade cost coefficients (i.e. language, contiguity and distance). This is because, controlling for preferences and information related costs, the border coefficients are now 'cleansed' of these sources of market access differences, as previously shown by Olper and Raimondi (2006) .
Finally, equation (3) adds two classical endowment measures, land per-capita
and GDP per-capita, to control for cross-country differences in comparative advantage. Indeed, it is quite natural to think that bilateral food trade is positively affected by the relative endowment in land, given the resource based (land) nature of many food products, and by the overall differences in capital perworker. The two variables have the expected positive sign and are highly significant and, interestingly, they induce a significant change in the estimated border coefficients that appears in line with the factor-proportion-comparativeadvantage hypothesis. Indeed, in each bilateral combination we see a reduction (increase) in the border coefficients of the relative land abundant (scarce)
countries that is roughly proportional to the country's endowment differences in land.
With this modification of the base model, the strong border effect asymmetries shown in regression (1) Finally, note that Japan's border effect incongruence, albeit reduced, is still present, and appears quite strong, especially in trade combinations involving Canada and the EU as trading partners. As Japan is the world's leading food importer -due to its strong natural resource (land) constraints -a probable explanation of the above results also lies in the fact that our monopolistic competition model is not well suited to capture this effect.
Industry level market access
The border effect also differs across industry. Table 2 gives the results of industry-specific gravity equations with a specification that omits our proxy for information related costs and 'preferences', to estimate 'overall' differences in industry border effects. The results are base on OLS or Heckman two-stage procedure to address selection bias concerns. Specifically, when in the Heckman' second stage regression the Mills ratio was significant, we rely on this estimated results, differently we use results from simple OLS regressions 12 .
One advantage of these industry regressions is that the trade elasticity to distance is now also industry-specific, thus it captures the across sector differences in physical transport costs, as well as in the elasticity of substitution.
Due to space constraints the table reports only the estimated coefficients of distance and border dummy, with their respective t-value, and the implied value of border effect, sorting the food sectors in decreasing order of magnitude 13 .
In these equations the border coefficient is the constant. Head and Mayer (2000) and Chen (2004) on intra-EU trade, both for order and magnitude of border effects, suggesting that different countries display similar patterns in food industry border effects.
As it is evident from The Heckman two-stage procedure was implemented as follows. We first estimate a probit model regressing, on an indicator of positive trade, all the explanatory variables of the model plus levels of the exporter's production, price, and distance (see Head and Mayer, 2000) . Then, from the probit coefficients, we calculate the Mills ratio adding them to the original (OLS) specification. The probit estimated coefficients (not reported) are quite similar in signs and significance to the OLS. Finally, as a general rule the Heckman procedure tend to increase some what the estimate border coefficients. 13 The (not reported) coefficients on relative production, contiguity, language and land per-capita, are systematically significant and display the correct sign; on the other hand relative prices and GDP per-capita in a few regressions are insignificant and/or of the wrong sign. −1.71. 14 Most interesting is the fact that distance elasticity shows a strong negative correlation with industry border coefficients (r = −0.66). This is a quite counterintuitive result. In fact, from equation (7) we know that the coefficients of distances are given by the elasticity of substitution times the elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance. Thus, if the substitution elasticity represents a large component of the border effect explanation, we can expect distance and border coefficients to be positively correlated (see Chen, 2004: 106) . However, exactly the opposite was found. So, how to explain this negative correlation? An appealing explanation is one of political economy motives for trade protection.
Indeed, countries give higher protection to industries where physical transport costs are less severe, and tend to give less protection to sectors where, due to high transport costs, import competition is less important.
Estimations at the industry level allow us to evaluate the degree of reciprocity in QUADs bilateral market access. To this end, we split each industry border dummy into 13 border dummies, one for each bilateral relationships between the access is very high for trade between Canada and the US (r = 0.77), and between 14 This average elasticity is significantly higher in absolute value than the distance elasticity shows in Table 1 . This is due to the different specifications used here, where we omit the country border dummies to estimate (across-country) average industry-specific border effects. In the industry regressions that also include the bilateral country dummies (see below), the across industry average distance elasticity is equal to −1.17. The correlation between the two series of distance the EU and Japan (0.64). It assumes an average value for trade between the EU and the US (0.52) and the EU and Canada (0.32), but is virtually zero for trade between Japan and both the US and Canada. A similar, but less important, positive correlation was detected by Fontagné et al. (2005) at the manufacturing level. They interpret this pattern in terms of endogenous protection, namely industries in different countries have the same pattern of sensitivity, probably because they display similar industry characteristics. Moreover, because a component of our market access proxy is 'home bias' in preferences, that is notoriously quite strong in processed foods (see Lopez et al., 2006) , another explanation for this positive correlation could be the similar degree of 'home bias' in preferences across industries in different countries.
Let us move on to the results for reciprocity in market access. From the figures it appears quite evident that in all the combinations we detect significant asymmetry in border effects. That is to say, several countries tend to impose higher border costs on the other partners for the majority of processed foods. For example, this is the case for trade between the EUs vs. the US, and for Canada vs. the US (see Figures 1 and 2 Figure 3 ). On the other hand, the only country pair combination that displays some form of symmetry in market access is that between the US and Japan (Figure 4) , where we observe a relatively 'comparable' number of positive and negative differences in border effects. Note however that, all the country pair combinations involving Japan, suffer the 'puzzling' result discussed above, that sees Japan often more open to food imports than the reverse, and this is especially true for combinations involving the EU ( Figure 5 ).
elasticity is close to 1, showing that the across industry ranking in physical transport costs reported in Table 2 is 
What determines these big asymmetries?
In the previous section we documented a significant variation in border effects both among countries and across industries. The objective of this section is to collect proxies for the main determinants of border effects with the aim of rechallenging previous findings.
Theoretically, border effect is equal to the product of two things (see Section 2.2): the degree of substitutability between goods and the tariff equivalent of border related costs. Both terms are crucial to understand border effects. In sectors with high substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, even low level of border barriers can induce a significant reduction in market access.
Differently, for a given value of the elasticity of substitution, each country or industry characteristic that affects the border barriers represents a good candidate to explain the border (Chen, 2004) . Here, we focus our attention on four key potential explanations: trade policy (tariffs and NTBs), spatial clustering, the degree of product differentiation (as proxy for elasticity of substitution), and 'home bias' in preferences.
Clearly, the more intuitive explanation is that border effect largely arises because governments use trade policy to discriminate between domestic and foreign goods. However, previous evidence does not univocally support this interpretation. For example, Hillberry (1999) , for trade between the US and Canada, and Head and Mayer (2000) and Chen (2004) for intra-EU trade, did not find any significant role for tariff and non-tariff barriers, respectively. At the same time, though some papers do find a role for policy (see Evans, 2003; Fontagné et al., 2005) , the component of the border attributable to trade policy is quite tiny. 15
To test the trade−policy−border−effects relationship we make use of industry ad valorem bilateral tariffs computed starting from the Market Access Map (MacMap) tariffs at HS 6-digit (see Boüet et al., 2004) , then aggregated using import weights to match our ISIC 4-digit classification. For non-tariff barriers (NTBs) we use the ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) recently estimated by Kee et al. (2006) at the HS 6-digit level, 16 aggregated at the ISIC 4-digit, using import weights. It is important to note that, due to data problems, all the previous applications instead of the AVE of NTBs, have normally used or simple dummy variable (Head and Mayer, 2000; Chen, 2004) , or frequency-type index (Haveman et al., 2003; Fontagné et al., 2005; Mayer and Zignago, 2005) to capture the trade effect of NTBs. However, this procedure is not without problems as it imposes strong regularity conditions. Indeed, it assumed that all changes in the coverage ratio are equally important for trade flow, ignoring the fact that different NTBs can have different trade effects (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2004) . Moreover, an interesting advantage in using the AVE of NTBs lies in the direct comparability with the estimated coefficient of tariffs.
Let us now move on to other potential explanations, considering spatial clustering first. Several authors suggest that border effect could arise endogenously because, in order to avoid trade costs, firms producing intermediate and final goods tend to co-agglomerate within political boundaries (see Wolf, 2000; Hillberry and Hummels, 2002) . The argument is that firms not tied to a specific location tend to locate to minimize trade costs, thus reducing 15 One explanation for this weak evidence could, however, be data problems: actual direct protection measures only partially capture the whole story. For example, we lack good data on several non-tariff barriers to trade, such as the myriad of technical and sanitary barriers imposed by government regulations. At the same time tariff data, notoriously less problematic than NTBs, are not without problems, especially when we look at their time dimension. 16 To obtain the AVE of NTBs, these authors first estimate the impact of NTBs on imports at the tariff line level using Leamer's comparative advantage approach. Then they transform the quantity impact into price equivalents, using a careful estimate of the import demand elasticity, at the HS 6-digit level. Note that, these data are not without problems (see Ferrantino, 2006) . For example, they ignore the potential positive effect on trade flows of some NTBs, due to the increase of information diffusion and network externality. However, to date, they represent the most accurate AVE of NTB estimates, with a large country/industry coverage.
international trade and increasing (endogenously) the border effects. The applicability of this reasoning to food industry, however, is not without problems.
Indeed, food sectors are often linked to a particular location not only with the intention of saving in transport costs, but also as a consequence of natural resource advantages (think of the wine industry) or because they want to satisfy customers' face-to-face requirements., In order to test the possible 'endogeneity' of the border effects, we make use of an industry, distance-based, 'spatial concentration' index, computed by Busch and Reinhardt (1999) 17 for US data at SIC 4-digit level, then converted to ISIC 4digit to match our industry classification. Unfortunately, the intensive data requirements to construct this index, prevented our use of country specific indices. However, previous authors who took a similar approach (see Chen, 2004) found robust results by adapting the US geographic concentration index to EU countries. The index is increasing in 'spatial concentration' with an average value for our industry sample of 0.43, a higher value for Manufacture of Tobacco (0.64) and a lower one for Processing and Preserving of Fish (0.22).
As discussed above, a key component of the border is the degree of product differentiation. Higher values tend to reduce the substitution possibility between domestic and imported goods. Thus trade will be higher, inducing a reduction in border effects. The degree of product differentiation is often proxy through the Rauch (1999) categorization of industry in 'homogenous', 'reference priced' and 'differentiated products' (see Evans, 2003; Chen, 2004) . 18 However, processed foods fall in the same Rauch category (homogenous goods), preventing our discrimination in terms of the degree of product differentiation. To circumvent this problem, we used an intuitive, admittedly imperfect, proxy to measure the degree of product differentiation: the log number of HS 6-digit category in each ISIC 4-digit. 19 This number shows high variability in processed foods, ranging from 2 HS line for ISIC-1533 (Manufacture of Prepared Animal 17 The spatial concentration index is measured as a decreasing function of the distance from each employee to the national 'centroid' or mid point for a given industry, and is based on 1987 US data. See Busch and Reinhardt (1999) for data source and computation details. 18 Strictly speaking, in Chen (2004) the Rauch index was intended to capture information related costs, on the grounds that 'search costs' tend to increase for differentiated products. Differently, Evans (2003) interprets the Rauch index as a proxy of the substitution elasticity across varieties. 19 More specifically this index represents the 'potential' degree of product differentiation for each ISIC 4-digit, because no longer are all HS-6 lines always fulfilled in each country pairs. Feed) to 75 HS line for ISIC-1513 (Processing and Preserving of Fruit), with an average lines number of 22.5.
Finally, to capture 'home bias' in preferences, we take advantage of the Broad Economic Categories (BEC), to classify products in intermediate versus consumption goods. Basically, using the BEC concordance with HS 6-digit, we classified our ISIC 4-digit industries in terms of the value share in each sector for a given importer who deals in consumption goods. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with an average value of 0.78. The underlying hypothesis is that preferences will be more distorted towards domestic products when consumers, rather than firms, decide the origin of the goods consumed (Fontagné et al., 2005) . 20
Estimation and Results
To estimate the impact of the various factors discussed above we follow the approach used by Head and Ries (2001) , Head and Mayer (2000) and Chen In what follows, we estimate variations of the following basic equation derived from the model specification discussed in Section 2
where bik are the 234 (13 x 18) estimated country-industry-specific border coefficients based on equation (7); βik represents a vector of all the determinants 20 A limitation of this index is that the level of tariff protection also increases on passing from primary, intermediate to final consumer goods in food industry, due to tariff escalation. 21 Another approach is to directly insert each determinant of the border into the gravity equation (see Fontagné et al., 2005; Olper and Raimondi, 2006) , and measure the resulting reduction in the estimated border coefficients. A problem with this approach is that we are comparing results from different estimations. In fact, the estimations do not include the same variables, and estimated coefficients of several explanatory variables (e.g., distance, contiguity and language) differ between the regressions. Therefore, part of the variation observed in the constants of the equation, which represent the border effects in our model, is just due to variations in the estimated coefficients on all variables between regressions. of the border different from trade policies, comprise a common intercept and (eventually) country and industry fixed effects; finally εik is the error term.
The estimation of the 234 border effects is based on one year's (2000) (2001) OLS regression, as the key determinants of our interests, tariffs and AVE of NTBs refer to this period. 22 Finally, following Head and Mayer (2000) and Chen (2004) to reduce the heteroskedasticity problems of using a dependent variable estimated with error, we use weighted-least-squares, with weights equal to the inverse of the standard errors of the estimated border coefficients. Finally, to simplify the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, we have multiplied the dependent variable by −1.
The regression results are reported in Table 3 . In line with our a-priori expectation, the border effects display a positive and significant association with trade policies, suggesting that both tariffs (Column (1)) and NTBs (Column (2)) are important components of the border 23 . It is interesting to note that NTBs display both a higher estimated coefficient and explanatory power than tariffs.
Thus, for our country and industry sample, the border effects appear particularly affected by non-tariff barriers to trade. The degree of 'spatial concentration' displays a significant and positive affect on the border effects. This means that the more 'spatial concentrated' a sector is, more it display an higher, and not lower, border effect. A result contrary to Chen (2004) who shows that, in the EU, firms that are not geographically concentrated display larger border effects. Thus our findings do not support the argument of Wolf (2000) , Hillberry (2002) , and Hillberry and Hummels (2002) on the endogeneity of the border effects, suggesting that this kind of interpretation tends to be industry-specific.
Moreover, a competing explanation with this argument, not mentioned in the previous literature on border effect, is that because 'spatial concentration' represents a (positive) political economy determinant of protection (see Busch 22 Clearly, it would be better to estimate these border coefficients through specific-industry regressions. However, when working on a single year certain regressions have very few observations, inducing volatility in estimated border effects. 23 The coefficients on tariffs implies an average elasticity of substitution between varieties equal to 3.30. This value is somewhat higher than the recent estimate by Lai and Trefler (2004) , who find an elasticity of substitution of 2.50 for aggregate food industry (3-digit ISIC). Thus, because we are working at a 4-digit level, our result is consistent with the notion that the elasticity of substitution tends to increase with the level of desegregation (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). and Reinhardt, 1999) , the significant positive coefficients shown in Table 3 could simply capture this kind of relationship. 24 Our proxy for the degree of goods differentiation displays the correct, and significant, negative effect (Column (4)). Thus, the more differentiated the goods, the less sensitive consumer is to a given level of trade costs, and the lower the border effects, a finding consistent with both Evans (2003) and Fontagné et al. (2005) . Finally, Column (5) adds our proxy for 'home bias' in preferences, the share of final goods in each industry for the importer countries. It shows positive and significant coefficients, meaning that for intermediate goods the border effect level tends to be lower: thus, 'home bias' in preferences represents a part of the story. However, note that the explanatory power of our proxies for both the elasticity of substitution and 'home bias' are significantly lower than that of policy variables, suggesting that in the food industry trade policies matter.
Next, adding together all the explanatory variables (Column (6)), it can be seen that the coefficients on tariffs shrink substantially and become insignificant. This effect is due especially to the simultaneous introduction of NTBs and 'spatial concentration' index, that are in fact both positively correlated with tariffs. Finally, in Column (7) we add to the regression the industry fixed effects at 3-digit level to check for robustness. As it is clear by the inspection of the regression coefficients, our results and conclusions are substantial unaffected.
Overall, our results suggest that, in the food industry, trade barriers, especially in the form of NTBs, are important components of the reason why national borders affect trade flows. However, the results also highlight that elements not directly linked to trade costs, such as home bias in preferences and the elasticity of substitution, play a role in explain the magnitude of the border.
Thus, the increase in market integration due to regional and WTO trade agreements should, through the removal of trade barriers, contribute to 
Conclusions
The present paper analyzes the level and asymmetry in food industry reciprocal market access of the so-called QUAD countries − the US, Canada the EU and Japan. These countries represent the main trading blocks that account for more than one third of world trade in processed foods. Using the border effects approach estimated from a structural gravity model, we measure the friction each country faces when exporting to another QUAD countries. In a second step we challenge the main explanation of border effects.
At the aggregate level we detected strong asymmetry in market access: indeed, US exports to the EU appear much more affected by the border than the reverse, and the same can be said for US exports to Canada. Quite surprisingly, Japan seems to be more open to processed food imports from QUAD countries than the reverse, and this holds true even if we control for differences in comparative advantage.
The industry-level analysis gives details on market access at the 4-digit ISIC level, confirming the presence of reciprocal asymmetric border effects and showing that countries tend to display quite similar patterns in across-industry variation in border effects.
Exploring the possible underlying reasons in border effects we show that trade policies, especially in the form of non-tariff barriers to trade, seem to matter in food industry, and this partially contrasts with previous findings. However, other underlying explanations of the border, especially 'home bias' in preferences and the magnitude of substitution elasticity, also play a role. These findings are broadly consistent with the most recent developments in border effect literature (e.g. Evans, 2003; Fontagné et al. 2005; Mayer and Zignago, 2005) . On the other hand, we did not find any evidence that the border effect is 'endogenous', due to firm's location decisions in order to reduce trade costs, as suggested, among others, by Hillberry (2002) and Chen (2004) . In the food industry, differently, the 'endogeneity' of border effect seems largely be due to political economy motives, namely government-set trade policies to contrast import competition from sectors where, apart from trade policy, trade costs tend to be low. Notes: Weighted last-square estimations, see text for details; t-values are given in parentheses; the reported adj R 2 refer to un-weighted statistics; moving from the left to the right the weighted adj R 2 are, 0.397, 0.422, 0.398, 0.401 0.365, 0.572 and 0.568, respectively. 
